Short answer
Yes, if the controller or your contractor's remote access can be reached from the internet. In October 2026 attackers used a known flaw in Danfoss system managers to heat fridges at hundreds of French supermarkets for six hours overnight. The same login that changes a set point can change the alarm limits, so patch the controller, keep it off the internet, and run a separate monitor with its own alerts.
On the night of 11 October 2026, attackers reached the refrigeration controllers at several hundred French supermarkets and ran the cabinets in defrost until they reached about 50°C. Intermarché, Carrefour, Monoprix and Coopérative U all lost stock, some stores caught fire, and Intermarché’s chief executive put the loss at tens of millions of euros in one day. Danfoss, the controller maker, said the affected units were running outdated firmware.
The part of that story that matters for an Australian food business is not the headline temperature. It is that the fridges in about 150 Intermarché stores sat at 50°C for roughly six hours overnight before anyone acted. This guide covers how a refrigeration controller can be reached from outside, why its own alarm is not a safeguard, four questions to put to your contractor this week, and what a separate monitor does and does not protect against.
What actually happened in France
- A system manager, the controller that runs a whole store’s cabinets and cool rooms, was reached over the internet and set to defrost. Reporting names the Danfoss AK-SM 800 and AK-SC 355 series.
- In August 2026 the security firm Claroty had published three flaws in the AK-SM 800A, including a hidden login that accepts a password worked out from the day’s date. That login gives administrator access to the whole interface: temperature limits, schedules, alarm history, notification settings and remote maintenance. Danfoss fixed it in firmware R4.3.1 and the US cyber agency CISA issued an advisory. Claroty counted 2,765 of these controllers reachable from the internet.
- Investigators have not yet said publicly which flaw was used. Danfoss says most affected equipment was legacy product that no longer receives security updates.
- A Sekoia analyst said sites in Spain, Portugal, Poland, Germany and Belgium were also affected.
Sources: ABC News, Claroty Team82, CISA advisory ICSA-25-140-03.
How a store’s fridges are controlled
A commercial fridge or cool room does not have its own internet connection. The compressor, fans and defrost heater are switched by a case controller, and in any site bigger than a corner shop those case controllers report to a system manager on the plant room wall. The system manager holds the set points, the defrost schedules, the alarm limits and the history for every cabinet in the building.
Because a refrigeration contractor cannot drive to every site for every adjustment, the system manager usually has a web page that can be opened remotely. That remote access is the convenience that makes a store run, and it is also the door. As Professor Ryan Ko of the University of Queensland told the ABC after the French attack, attackers do not need to hack individual fridges; they get in through compromised credentials, vulnerable remote access services or third-party suppliers, and once inside they can change set points across many locations at once.
In Australia the major chains run centralised platforms from the large controls vendors, and Woolworths has described using Emerson’s Connect+ system to see every store from one place. Independent grocers, butchers, clubs, caterers and manufacturers more often have a single Danfoss, Copeland or RDM controller that a contractor dials into. In August 2026 Climate Control News carried a warning to Australian users of both the Danfoss AK-SM 800A and the Copeland XWEB Pro to update their firmware, after Claroty reported 23 flaws in the Copeland unit as well.
Why the controller’s own alarm is not a safeguard
Every system manager can raise an alarm when a cabinet runs warm. The problem is where that alarm lives. Administrator access to the controller includes the alarm limits, the notification addresses and the alarm log. Anyone who can set a cabinet to defrost can also raise the high-temperature limit to 60°C, delete the email address the alarm goes to, or simply turn the alarm off first. The record of the event lives on the same box.
This is the ordinary rule of any safety system: the check should not depend on the thing it is checking. A smoke alarm is not wired through the stove’s control panel. For the same reason, the temperature check should not run through the refrigeration controller.
The ABC’s experts made a related point about small operators. Dr Jennifer Williams of Macquarie University noted that independent stores without a wide centralised system could be less exposed than the chains, while Professor Ko warned that smaller retailers may have fewer resources for security and could be easier to compromise. Both are true. A single controller is a smaller target, but it is also the one most likely to be running five-year-old firmware with the installer’s original password.
Four questions for your refrigeration contractor this week
- Which controller does the site run, and which firmware version? If it is a Danfoss AK-SM 800A below R4.3.1, a Copeland XWEB Pro below 1.13, or any model the maker lists as end of life, it needs updating or replacing.
- Can the controller’s web page be opened from outside the shop’s network? The answer should be no. Remote access should go through the contractor’s VPN or a remote-access service that needs a second factor, never a port opened on the shop router.
- Who holds a login, and when were the passwords last changed? Count the contractor’s technicians, the previous contractor, the installer and the head office. Remove everyone who no longer needs it.
- If a cabinet reaches 10°C at 2 am, whose phone rings? If the answer is “the controller emails the office”, nobody is reading it until 8 am. The French stores lost six hours this way.
Write the answers down. If the contractor cannot answer the first two, treat the controller as exposed until it has been checked.
What a separate monitor does and does not do
An independent monitor is a second set of eyes with its own path out of the building. Wireless sensors sit inside each cabinet and cool room and send air temperature by low-power radio to a gateway, which passes the readings to the cloud. The cloud checks every reading against the limits you set and sends SMS and email alerts to a call list you control. The system overview explains each layer.
What it protects against:
- A quiet controller. If the controller’s alarm has been raised, redirected or switched off, the monitor still sees the air warming and still sends the alert. Its limits and call list are not on the controller.
- The six-hour gap. Alerts go to phones within minutes, including overnight and on weekends, so the question becomes whether someone answers, not whether anyone knew.
- Being turned into a weapon. The sensors are read-only radios. They have no wiring to the compressor, the defrost heater or the controller, so there is nothing an attacker could use them to switch on. A monitoring-only system can tell you a fridge is warm; it cannot make one warm.
- The record. The temperature history for every unit is stored separately from the controller, which matters for the insurer and the health inspector after an incident as much as during it.
What it does not do:
- It cannot stop the controller being changed. Securing the controller is the contractor’s job and the four questions above are the start of it.
- It is itself a connected device. The gateway sends readings over an encrypted connection, and the dashboard, its database and every reading are hosted in Australia, in a Sydney data centre. Our privacy policy lists who else handles data and why. Thermalog keeps the gateway software current from the cloud; the French incident is a reminder of why that matters for any device on the network.
- If the site’s internet goes down, remote alerts stop until it returns. The 4G or Wi-Fi guide covers the options for sites that cannot rely on the shop network.
Where the sensors go and what limits to set are covered on the cold room and freezer monitoring page, and the freezer monitoring checklist lists what to confirm before you buy any system.
What it costs
A Cloud Gateway and one wireless sensor is $540 ex GST, plus $4 a sensor a month for monitoring, alerts and the audit history. Add a sensor for each cabinet or room, up to 32 on one gateway, or a Tablet Gateway for larger sites. A five-sensor kit covers most independent grocers and restaurants. The pricing page has every option, and the food-business monitoring page shows the setup for cafes, restaurants, caterers and manufacturers.
The French supermarkets will spend the next months on firmware, network segmentation and remote-access audits, and so should any Australian site with a controller a contractor can reach from home. None of that work tells you, at 2 am, that a cabinet is warming. That is a separate job for a separate device.